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Gold Ridge Partners v. Sierra Pacific Power Company, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 47 (Sept. 27, 2012)1
PROPERTY – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Summary
The Court considered a motion to remand a case on appeal to the district court.
Specifically, the Court weighed whether an eminent domain plaintiff could abandon its claim
after the plaintiff paid just compensation and the district court entered a final condemnation
order, but before the resolution of a pending appeal. In reaching its conclusions, the Court
examined when a “final judgment” for the purposes of N.R.S. § 37.180(1) takes place, when an
eminent domain taking is completed under the Constitution,2 and whether a district court
maintains limited jurisdiction to dismiss an eminent domain claim on appeal if the plaintiff
abandons its claim.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court concluded that an eminent domain plaintiff may abandon its claim while the
case is on appeal, even if the plaintiff has paid just compensation and the district court has
entered an order of condemnation. This is because, pursuant to N.R.S. § 37.180(1), there is no
“final judgment” until all appeals are resolved, and the plaintiff has 30 days from the date of final
judgment to abandon. Additionally, while the Court cannot force an eminent domain defendant
to retake property once the taking is completed, pursuant to the Constitution and N.R.S. §
37.180(1), a taking is not complete until 30 days after “final judgment.” Furthermore, because
N.R.S. § 37.180(1) requires the district court to dismiss an eminent domain action upon notice of
abandonment, the district court retains limited jurisdiction to dismiss the claim even if it is on
appeal. Since the plaintiff timely abandoned the claim, and since the district court maintained
limited jurisdiction to dismiss it based on the plaintiff’s abandonment, the motion for remand
was moot.
Factual and Procedural History
The district court awarded plaintiff, Sierra Pacific (“Sierra”), possession of land owned
by defendants, Gold Ridge Partners, et al. (“Landowners”). A jury determined that Sierra owed
Landowners $4.4 million in compensation for the taking. Sierra paid the compensation, which
Landowners took and used to pay off various encumbrances on the land, and the district court
entered a judgment and order of condemnation, which Sierra recorded. At the same time,
Landowners appealed issues related to the valuation of land, and Sierra cross-appealed on similar
grounds. While the appeal was pending, Sierra noticed the district court of its intent to abandon
the condemnation and asked the district court to vacate the condemnation judgment and order.
The Nevada Supreme Court considered a motion to remand this case to the district court so that
the district court could act on Sierra’s motion to vacate based on abandonment.3
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By Adam Tully, Junior Staff Member, Nevada Law Journal.
Although the Court is not explicit, presumably it is referring to the Nevada Constitution.
3
The Nevada Supreme Court opinion treats Sierra’s motion to vacate as a motion to dismiss based on
abandonment, as described in N.R.S. § 37.180(1), because both motions have the same practical effect.
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Discussion
Justice Parraguirre authored the opinion, joined by Justices Douglas, Saitta, and
Hardesty. Justice Gibbons, joined by Chief Justice Cherry, wrote separately, concurring. Justice
Pickering did not participate in this decision.
A “final judgment” refers to any judgment that can no longer be attacked by appeal,
motion for new trial, or motion to vacate.4 According to the plain meaning of N.R.S. §
37.180(1), an eminent domain plaintiff has 30 days from the date of “final judgment” to abandon
its claims.5 This statutory provision allows eminent domain plaintiffs to know the exact
compensation due before deciding whether to take the property or abandon the proceedings.
Landowners urged the Court to use the date that Sierra paid the $4.4 million as the date of final
judgment, as opposed to the date when appeal would no longer be available. This construction
directly conflicts with the language and apparent intent of N.R.S. § 37.180(1). Under
Landowners’ proposed rule, if the Court determined on appeal that Sierra owed Landowners
significantly more compensation, Sierra would have no choice but to pay the enhanced
compensation because its opportunity to abandon would have passed. As such, the plain meaning
and apparent intent of N.R.S § 37.180(1) demonstrate that Sierra had 30 days from the date when
appeal was no longer available to abandon its eminent domain claim.
Furthermore, an eminent domain defendant has no constitutional, vested interest in
compensation until the taking is complete. Landowners argued that Sierra could not
constitutionally abandon because the taking was completed, the plaintiff held title, and
Landowners acquired a vested interest in the compensation. While it is true that once a taking is
complete, an eminent domain defendant cannot be forced to retake the property,6 each state
determines for itself when a taking in its jurisdiction is completed.7 According to the Court’s
interpretation of N.R.S. § 37.180(1), a taking is not completed until 30 days after final judgment.
As such, Landowners did not acquire a constitutional interest in compensation because,
according to Nevada law, the taking was not completed.
Even when an eminent domain claim is on appeal, the district court maintains limited
jurisdiction to dismiss that claim if the plaintiff timely abandons. This is because N.R.S. §
37.180(1) requires the district court to dismiss an eminent domain claim upon plaintiff’s timely
notice of abandonment.8 This is distinguishable from the Court’s interpretation of the language
“at any time” in a child custody statute. In Mack-Manley v. Manley, this Court held that a statute
that permitted the district court to modify a child custody order “at any time” did not give the
district court the jurisdictional power to modify a child custody order while the case was on
appeal.9 Because N.R.S. § 37.180(1) obliges the district court to dismiss an eminent domain
claim upon timely abandonment, the district court maintains limited jurisdiction to dismiss those
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.009(2) (2007) (“‘Final judgment’ means a judgment which cannot be directly attacked by
appeal, motion for new trial or motion to vacate the judgment.”).
5
NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.180(1) (2007) (“The plaintiff may abandon the proceedings at any time after filing the
complaint and before the expiration of 30 days after final judgment . . . .”).
6
Carl Roessler, Inc. v. Ives, 239 A.2d 538, 541 (Conn. 1968).
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Id.
8
NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.180(1) (2007) (“Upon that abandonment, on motion of any party, a judgment must be
entered dismissing the proceedings . . . .”) (emphasis added).
9
Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 855, 138 P.3d 525, 529-30 (2006) (interpreting NEV. REV. STAT. §
125.510(1)(b) (2007)).

claims, even if they are on appeal. This is a sensible rule in light of the fact that abandonment
will likely render any issues on appeal moot.
Conclusion
Sierra timely noticed the district court that it had abandoned its eminent domain claim.
The district court maintained limited jurisdiction to dismiss the eminent domain claim based on
Sierra’s abandonment. As such, the motion to remand was moot because the district court is
empowered to determine the appropriateness of dismissal.
Concurrence
Justice Gibbons, joined by Chief Justice Cherry, wrote separately to emphasize the fact
that Landowners may be entitled to equitable estoppel, and the district court should consider
those arguments when deciding whether abandonment and dismissal are appropriate.

